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ISLAMIC LAW AND AMBIVALENT
SCHOLARSHIP
Khaled Abou El Fad/*

THE JUSTICE OF ISLAM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMIC
LAw AND SOCIETY. By Lawrence Rosen. Oxford: Oxford University
Press. 2000. Pp. 248. Cloth, $80; paper, $29.95.
This book reminds me of the image of the arrogantly condescend
ing and blustering tourist in Cairo who drifts into a store that has
taken the trouble of prominently displaying the price of their com
modities in nicely typed tags. Nevertheless, the tourist walks in, reads
the price tag, and then proclaims, "Okay, what is the real price?" The
poor store employee stares at him with incredulity, and simply repeats
the price on the tag,· and, in response, the tourist emits this knowing
and smug smile as if saying, "I know you guys, you never mean what
you say; everything in Arab culture is negotiable, everything is subject
to bargaining, and I will not be fooled." Of course, the tourist misses
the point. The price on the tag is the real price, and there is no expec
tation of haggling, bargaining, or any other reconstruction of reality.
Before arriving in Cairo, however, the tourist has already received a
steady dosage of advice about the Arab bazaar. Everything, the tourist
is told, in the Arab market is negotiable; so never take any of the ad
vertised prices at face value, and argue and haggle to your heart's con
tent.
Lawrence Rosen's1 book is not intended to give advice to tourists
about how to get the most for their money; it is nothing short of an at
tempt to explain the Islamic and Arab conception of justice. The
author explicitly adopts the bazaar as the relevant model for under
standing Islamic conceptions of justice, whether old or new, rural or
urban, social or legal, or Muslim or Arab. But like our haggling tour
ist, whether intentionally or not, he ends up essentializing and depre-
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Princeton. - Ed. My deep gratitude to Grace Song, my wife, for being my reader and editor.
I also thank my research assistant Anver Emon for his hard work.

1. Professor and Chair of Anthropology, Princeton University; Adjunct Professor of
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eating his subject into a caricature that, although based on some truth,
is largely a fictional invention.
Rosen's book is difficult to summarize. It is a collection of previ
ously published articles that were put together in a poorly integrated
book. As a result, there are many repetitions and contradictions
throughout. In fact, one can trace the development of the author's
thought on some issues because .it is obvious that the articles were
written over a considerable span of time with various temperaments
and orientations. Rosen seems to have added a paragraph to the be
ginning of each chapter in an attempt to draw a common thread be
tween the various sections of the book. But it is clear that these begin
nings are forced upon the text in an attempt to convince the reader of
a systematic project and a thematic continuity that does not exist.
While the reader might possibly accept that eleven of the twelve chap
ters of the book are reflections on the anthropology of law, the last
chapter, which deals with Muslims in American courts, is at best tan
gential to the narrative of the book.
There are many methodological and factual errors in The Justice of
Islam, but I will be able to address only some of them. I will also avoid
dealing with problems that do not directly pertain to the author's sub
stantive arguments. But, at the outset, I feel compelled to note that
Rosen's book does not inspire much confidence. He gets the translit
eration of many Arabic words wrong, confuses colloquial with classical
Arabic,2 and fails to consult or cite practically any primary sources on
Islamic law. Nearly, all his knowledge of text-based Islamic law is de
rived from secondary sources. As I demonstrate below, there is no
clear research methodology to this book. Rosen is prone . to reaching
what seem like culturally based conclusions and then, working back
wards, he tends to cite anything that he believes supports his argu
ments. Depending on his conclusions, he cites the Qur'an, secondary
sources on classical Islamic law, reports attributed to the Prophet
Muhammad, contemporary Middle Eastern law, his own anthropo
logical research, and even anecdotal stories conveyed by friends.
There is, however, no clear and systematic methodology in his utiliza
tion of these sources. What seems to dictate Rosen's reliance on one
source or another is a largely selective - even opportunistic - system
of citation in support of his arguments about Muslim and Arab cul
ture.
2. Among the Arabic words that Rosen transliterates incorrectly are the following: 'udul
(p. 8); muhtasib (p. 8); as/ (p. 22); shadh; fitna (p. 26); hudud (p. 50); sadaq (p. 15); damin
(p. 180); qadhf (p. 191); zu/m (p. 156); wasta; and hadana. I suspect that Rosen's Moroccan
spoken Arabic is adequate, but, judging from the many mistakes he commits, it is likely that
his command of classical Arabic is weak. Importantly, Islamic and Moroccan law texts are
written in classical Arabic. It is difficult to imagine that a scholar can speak authoritatively
on classical Islamic law or modem Moroccan law without having a firm command of classical
Arabic.
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The main thesis of Rosen's book is that justice in Islam does not
focus on equality, but on equivalence. Islamic law is embedded in a
highly negotiable culture in which Muslims bargain for equivalence. In
this context, the status or role of persons, much more than facts, plays
the pivotal role in law and adjudication. Islamic law is inseparable
from its cultural context - a context that is not so much concerned
with rules and determinable results, but with conducible obligations,
and a dynamic process of social bargaining. Rosen contends that the
Arab bazaar offers the best model for understanding Islamic justice
and law. The bazaar is an active and dynamic place where there is con
stant haggling, bargaining, and shifting alliances. While it appears that
the bazaar is messy and perhaps chaotic, in fact there is a cultural con
text that makes the bazaar functional and logical. It is, to use Rosen's
expression, "ordered anarchy" (p. 143) . . If one understands the par
ticularity of culture, the bazaar will cease to be so alien, strange, or ir
rational. In this context, Rosen makes the important observation that
Islamic law is far more flexible and malleable than is commonly as
sumed. In fact, Rosen argues that Islamic law is similar in some impor
tant respects to the common law system, but with some important dif
ferences that he sets forth in his book.
In its broadest sense, Rosen's argument is sensible and even con
vincing: Islamic law has often been stereotyped as a rigid and inflexi
ble system of law that is disembodied from any cultural context, seen
primarily as a text-based speculative system of law that has little to do
with the sociological practices of its adherents. Rosen, on the other
hand, considers Islamic law to be thoroughly context based and cul
turally bound. Far from being a rigid and nonresponsive system, it en
gages the cultural paradigms of its adherents in an active and dynamic
fashion.
Much of Rosen's conclusions seem to be based on his observations
of court proceedings over a number of years in the Moroccan city of
Sefrou. Sefrou is an old but small city of about 70,000 people that is to
the south of Fez (p. 4). From his fieldwork in this small city, Rosen
generalizes about the nature of Islamic and Arab justice throughout
the ages and across the Arab world. He realizes, however, that consid
ering the broadness of his claims, this is an inadequate study sample.3
Therefore, Rosen cites and discusses classical Islamic law doctrines,
the Qur'an, traditions attributed to the Prophet, and some contempo
rary Arab law codes in support of his arguments. Nevertheless, he
does not attempt to explain the ways in which it can be said that the
text of the Qur'an, for instance, is representative of anything in con3. P. 110. Fairly late in the book, Rosen concedes that in certain respects Morocco might
not represent the whole Arab and Muslim world.
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temporary Arab culture. He does not explain the relationship between
classical Islamic law doctrines and modern cultural practices, or even
the ways that the various . and divergent existing Arab cultures can be
said to be Islamic or not Islamic. Furthermore, he does not seem to
distinguish between urban or rural, rich or poor, coastal or inland,
secular or temporal cultural contexts. Rather, Rosen is quite prone to
lump the complex and diverse realities of Arab and Islamic cultures
into one indistinct mass of negotiability; and bazaar-like existence.4
But using Rosen's own categories, one can say that there is no bazaar
rather, there is a suq (marketplace), and there is no single type of suq
in the Islamic or Arab world, but many varied and diverse suqs. In
Cairo alone, for example, there is the suq that one might find next to
the Azhar University in Asbakiyyah, which serves the students of the
theological seminary; there is also the suq that caters . primarily to
Western tourists in Khan al-Khalili; there is also the suq that caters to
the middle class in the Tahrir area; and the suq in Bulaq that serves a
clientele of impoverished communities. Each one of these markets has
its own culture and system of conduct that is not generalizable to the
other. Most importantly, these various markets are not simply reflec
tive of a broad category that we can call Islamic justice, but are the
product of a variety of influences, including ·some ·inherited Islamic
values, particular localized Egyptian practices, modern commercial
regulations, and Western and international commercial influences.
On numerous occasions in his book, Rosen makes remarkably
sweeping generalizations about the nature of Arab and Islamic cul
ture, often in a fashion that borders on the incredulous. In many ways,
Rosen posits himself as the see-it-all, know-it-all anthropologist who
can dive unfettered to the depths of the Arab mind and reality and in
form the readers, and probably Arabs themselves, about the true na
ture and thought of these people that he labels as Arabs. In addition,
Rosen assumes that anything Islamic is also Arab, and that anything
Arab is also Islamic, so that if he observes what he believes to be a cul
tural orientation in a particular Arab setting, he is quick to generalize
from that specific context to the whole of the Islamic legal tradition.
But even more, some of his generalizations are inexplicably offensive
and, in fact, his attempt to pretend that these generalizations allow a
greater sympathy and understanding of Arab culture is disingenuous,
at best. Although he consistently professes deep sympathy with Arabs
and Muslims, the ultimate image that he constructs is largely unflat
tering.
There are so many examples of these generalizations that it is im
possible to adequately cite or discuss all or even most of them. There"

4. Ironically, Rosen criticizes other scholars for indulging in broad generalizations about
diverse cultures, but Rosen's own generalizations are equally problematic. Pp. 44-45, 60.
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fore, I will survey only some of Rosen's broad generalizations about
Moroccans, Arabs, Muslims, and, ultimately, Islamic law. In order to
adequately preserve Rosen's style and accurately reflect his claims, I
will quote extensively from his book rather than paraphrase his argu
ments.
Rosen contends that truth in Islamic law is relative and contingent.
Truth depends on the context of interpersonal relationships in which
people bind each other through a dynamic of reciprocal obligations.
According to Rosen, " [f]or Moroccans, no utterance can by itself cre
ate a binding obligation" (p. 7). Indeed, mere expressions mean noth
ing unless "something more has happened,'.' in the sense that people
have acted in such a way as to create a sense of obligation (p. 7).
Rosen goes on to explain that for Arabs, mere utterances imply noth
ing about the truth of what is being asserted. Rather, for them truth is
constructed within the context of interpersonal obligations (p. 7).
Similarly, promises are meaningless unless validated by practice. Ac
cording to Rosen, "in the Arab world . . . mere utterances, once vali
dated by recognizable means, are taken very seriously, as validated ut
terances, [and] become vital to a person's reputation and
consequences in the world" (p. 149). From this, Rosen pronounces a
whole host of generalizations about the nature of truth, trust, and
words in the Arab world. "In the Moroccan view," Rosen asserts, "one
can identify and assess a person, an utterance, or an act only by their
consequences in the world of human relations" (p. 28). "For the
Arabs," Rosen adds, "it also follows that what matters in evaluating
actions is not their connection to a series of abstract propositions that
lie behind them but to the consequences that actions have in the
world. . . " (p. 72). Similarly, Rosen elaborates by noting that, "for
Arabs it is well understood that an assertion of relationship, standing
as a bare utterance, is not necessarily subject to evaluation in truth
terms at all" (p. 72). Rosen is then able to identify a major difference
between Arabs and Westerners. He proclaims: "Unlike the West,
where time reveals the truth of persons, in the Arab world it is rather,
nested bonds of obligation - like some elaborate map, or diagram of
an electrical system - that shows where another is located in social
space and what forces keep a person attached, consequent, identified"
(p. 41).
Interestingly, one of the things that Rosen cites in support of his
argument is an analysis of the word haqq (normally, translated as right
or truth) in Arabic. Rosen claims that the word haqq has a variety of
interconnected meanings - it can mean a right, duty, truth, reality,
and obligation. Rosen then comes to the startling conclusion that this
word in one context can mean 'you are right' and in another, 'you are
wrong' (p. 6). In reality, however, Rosen's claim that, depending on

·

1426

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 100:1421

context, this word can mean the opposite of right, is entirely without
foundation. But Rosen wants to prove that for Arabs, all rights and all
truth are relative. Hence, Rosen states: "the Arabs operate through a
social and contractual system which is radically relativized, one in
which permissible relationships are those one can manage to construct
within operational parameters that are themselves subject to modifica
tion as one marshals one's capabilities to make them hold swaf'
(p. 143). Arabs, Rosen contends, live in "ordered anarchy" (p. 143).
But, according to Rosen, Arabs find a sense of security and comfort in
this ordered anarchy. He states: "For Arabs, who believe that it is con
texts of relationship, not invariant capabilities, that most fully define a
person, actively entangling them in webs of indebtedness constitutes
the greatest predictability and security that one can have for their ac
tions towards oneself" (p . . 136). Rosen does not hesitate, however, to
claim that there is "a . sense of ambivalence inherent in virtually any
relationship and stance in Arab culture," as the Arabs engage in con
stant balancing accommodations as to all social or legal realities
(p. 158). Rosen deems himself capable to evaluate the subjective con
victions that Arabs have about life, and so he asserts: "Arabs believe
that social life is a running imbalance of obligations but that it is not
the imbalance that applies at any given time that matters but whether
the process by which the moving sets of relationships are themselves
formed has become unhinged" (p. 172). Arab life consists of ongoing
negotiation and balancing, and so there is a persistent state of relativ
ism and ambiguity. For Arabs, truth is in the process, not the facts, but
Rosen concludes: "It is here,-fraught with all the ambivalences atten
dant upon it, that the Arabs have made their cultural home" (p. 150).
Rosen does not in. any way distinguish between Moroccans, Arabs,
Muslims, or Islamic law. The existence of a particular characteristic in
one is generalizable to the other - in Rosen's mind, they are all one
indistinct mass. Having argued that ambivalence is the cultural home
of Arabs, Rosen extends his analysis to an evaluation of the meaning
of justice and rights for Muslims and Islamic law. Not surprisingly,
Rosen argues that, like their understanding of truth, for Arabs, justice
and rights are highly contextual, and relative as well. Arabs try to
achieve equivalence by taking into consideration the status of a person
in the context of. reciprocal obligations and duties. "When Arabs
speak about justice," Rosen informs us, "they invariably connect it
with the idea of the just person . . . " (p. 155). But the just person is not
an abstract idea; he/she is someone who is able to interact with his/her
context without disrupting it. In fact, Rosen asserts: "For Arabs jus
tice . . . is not an absolute, a set of propositions to which the insightful
must penetrate and give expression in the world" (pp. 170-71). Rather,
justice depends on the results of acts, and acts are evaluated in terms
of their efficacy for the social order, and not in terms of absolutes
(p. 171). Hence, according to Rosen, Arabs either do not understand
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or are not interested in abstract principles of justice because they are
only interested in the concrete results on the ground. Importantly,
however, the results on the ground are not evaluated by reference to
some abstract moral standard, but simply by reference to the impact
that behavior has on the social order. According to Rosen, "Muslim
judges characteristically insist that their goal is to get people back into
working relationships - contentious as they may be - rather than to
solve matters in a way that ignores future ties" (p. 41). Muslim judges
do not uphold the principle, or even the technicalities of law; they up
hold the social order. Having set the grounds in such a fashion, Rosen
is able to conclude that Arabs have no notion of abstract rights. "To
many Muslims," he states, "courts can no more be expected to pre
serve individual rights than might be expected in life at large - nor be
any less corrupt or any more wise" (pp. 74-75). Rosen then concludes:
"One only has rights, the Arabs say, to the extent that one can enforce
them" (p. 80).
Rosen's analysis on justice has some very concrete implications.
Not only do Arabs not believe, or even understand absolute notions of
truth, justice, or rights, but even corruption and bribery have very dif
ferent meanings in the Arab context. According to Rosen, bribery is
not corruption in Arab and Muslim culture. Corruption for Arabs is
the failure to share the benefits with the individuals with whom one
has formed bonds of interdependence. Therefore, bribery is corrup
tion only if it results in privileging an elite. As long as government of
ficials are accepting bribes from everyone, and not discriminating
against a particular group by refusing to take its moriey, then bribery is
not a problem. Consequently, Rosen asserts that in the Arab world:
"It is . . . as a deep expression of the centrality of justi�e as regulated
reciprocity that corruption can be defined as the failure to share with
one's network of co-dependants" (p. 163). Importantly, Rosen be
lieves that he is not only describing the cultural practices of Arabs, but
that he is also describing the nature of Islamic law. Islamic law, ac
cording to Rosen, is not found in law books, but in the cultural prac
tices of Arabs. As proof of this, Rosen claims that, "Islamic law em
braces the culture quite directly." Rosen explains that this is the case
because: "Muslims consistently say that their customs do not stand
apart from or alongside Islamic law; rather, they see their customs as
Islamic law, provided they do not contravene a clear Quranic precept"
(p. 57; emphasis in original). What is most distinctive about Rosen's
discourse is its unrestrained nature. While on several occasions he
criticizes other scholars for essentializing and stereotyping Arabs,
Muslims, and Islamic law, he himself does not show any restraint in
this regard.
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Rosen, however, can be a sophisticated researcher who, at times,
displays glimpses of real insight. For example, Rosen goes so far as to
remind his readers that: "Characterizations of justice in other cultures
often reveal more about the analyst than the society under considera
tion" (p. 153). This serves as a warning to analysts not to project their
own subjectivities and biases upon the culture under study. Yet, in
practice, this is a warning that Rosen does not heed, and as a result,
many of his generalizations are difficult to understand or even excuse.
So, for instance, at one point Rosen claims the following: "And every
one in Morocco, however well or poorly educated, has a firm grasp of
the essentials of inheritance law, particularly as it relates to women re
ceiving one-half the share granted men of similar genealogical distance
from the deceased" (pp. 89-90). I am not sure how Rosen knows this
- he does not claim to have interviewed every single Moroccan, edu
cated or not, about the essentials of inheritance law. In fact, he, him
self, does not display any particular competence in understanding the
essentials of Islamic or Moroccan inheritance law. There is a consider
able amount of debate in Islamic law regarding how to assess genea
logical distance, and there are a variety of scenarios in which a female
inherits the same amount as a male of identical or even greater ge
nealogical distance. For example, according to several schools of
thought, the female spouse would inherit a greater share than the sur
viving male sibling of the deceased.5 This would be clearly inconsistent
with Rosen's characterization regarding the essentials of Islamic in
heritance law. On another occasion, in support of his argument that
Arabs think of justice only in terms of the just person, Rosen states:
"In Morocco, as throughout the Arab world, people will often refer to
certain individuals as 'the notables of the area' (a'yan al-bi/ad)"
(p. 19). Rosen goes on to explain that such notables have a special
status, and perform an important role in the administration of justice.
Importantly, however, Rosen's claim is entirely without foundation.
The expression a'yan al-bi/ad is most often used in rural areas in which
the individual is not anonymous, and in which traditional structures of
power continue to exist. For instance, in the large and amorphous halls
of justice in Cairo or Damascus, the so-called notables play no role in
the administration of justice. If a rich, powerful, or politically con
nected person exercises undue influence upon a Cairo or Damascus
judge, this is called corruption, and is, in fact, prohibited by a host of
criminal codes. Similarly, although Rosen insists that bribery is not
5. See MUHAMMAD ABU ZAHRA, AHKAM AL-TARIKAT WA AL-MAWARITH 114-27
(Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi 1987); MUHAMMAD AHMAD IBN RUSHD (A.K.A. AVERROES),
BIDAYAT AL-MUJTAHID WA NIHAYAT AL-MUQTASID 672-73 (Beirut: Dar lbn Hazm 1999)
[hereinafter IBN RUSHD, BIDAYAT AL-MUJTAHID, Dar lbn Hazm ed.]; MUHAMMAD
JAWWAD MUGHNIYYA, AL-FIQH 'ALA AL-MADHAHIB AL-KHAMSA 506-12 (Beirut: Dar al
Jawad 1984); DAVID s. POWERS, STUDIES IN QUR'AN AND HADITH: THE FORMATION OF
THE ISLAMIC LAW OF INHERITANCE 9-10, 43 (1986).
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corruption in the Arab world as long as it does not result in privileging
an elite, he fails to acknowledge that both in Islamic law and the leg
islation of most Arab countries, rishwah (bribery) is a crime punish
able by law.6 While bribery and corruption are a reality in many un
derdeveloped countries, the fact remains that they are considered a
crime, and that any person who has practiced law in countries such as
Morocco, Egypt, Kuwait, Syria, Jordan and others will attest to the
fact that prisons are full of people convicted of the crime of giving or
receiving a bribe. But my point here is not to quibble with Rosen over
the facts. Rather, I am pointing out that Rosen formulates caricatures
of Moroccans, Arabs, Muslims, and Islamic law that are offensive, and
that ought not to pass for scholarship. As a further example of this
caricatured image that Rosen constructs, in describing a fairly chaotic
scene of a Moroccan court in Sefrou, he explains that the litigants of
ten shqut over each other, and that the court's clerk tries to quiet peo
ple down by trying to pin down their hands. Rosen adds that the clerk
does .so, "in the certain knowledge that no Moroccan can speak if his
hands are not free . . . " (p. 11). Perhaps, it is beside the point to note
that a court scene in Cairo or Kuwait City would be very different. In
urban centers, rules of procedure and the whole decorum of perform
ance would be very different from what Rosen has apparently wit
nessed in Sefrou. Perhaps, it is also beside the point to note that the
type of chaotic proceedings Rosen describes would be similar to what
takes place in a small claims court in New York City or Los Angeles.
It is more pertinent that one has. no idea how Rosen manages to assess
the so-called certain knowledge of the court clerk, or how Rosen man6. A report attributed to the Prophet states: "God curses the person who gives a bribe
or receives it, or facilitates it." Cited in HILALI ' ABD ALLAH AHMAD, USUL AL-TASHRI'
AL-JINA'! AL-ISLAM! 291 (Cairo: Dar al-Nahda al-'Arabiyya 1995). On classical Islamic law
and the prohibition against giving or receiving bribes, see ABU BAKR AHMAD
B. ' AMRW AL-SHAYBANI AL-KHASSAF, KITAB ADAB AL-QADI 111-18, (Farhat Ziadeh ed.,
Cairo: American University in Cairo Press 1978) [hereinafter AL-KHASSAF, KITAB ADAB
AL-QADI]; 'UMAR B. 'ABD AL-'AZIZ AL-BUKHARI AL-SADR AL-SHAHID, 2 KITAB SHARH
ADAB AL-QADI 23-65 (Muhyi Hila! al-Sarhan ed., Baghdad: Matba'at al-Irshad 1977)
[hereinafter AL-SADR AL-SHAHID, KITAB SHARH ADAB AL-QADI]. In fact, many classical
jurists went one step further, and argued that in order to avoid undue influence, judges
should not accept compensation for their·job. lbn Abi al-Damm writes that where someone
is obligated to serve in the office of qadi, he is not permitted to take any compensation for
his services unless he is poor. However, even if he is poor, any and all compensation is to
come from the public treasury (bayt al-ma/) and not the parties to a dispute themselves. If he
voluntarily assumes the judgeship, he may receive payment, although this is not to be pre
ferred. Various classical discourses clearly suggest a desire to avoid even the appearance of
impropriety. SHIHAB AL-DIN 'ABD ALLAH IBN ABI AL-DAMM, KITAB ADAB AL-QADA' 5758 (Muhammad 'Abd al-Qadir 'Ata ed., Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 1987) [hereinafter
IBN AB! AL-DAMM, KITAB ADAB AL-QADA']. For an example of modern Arab legislation
against bribery, see QANUN AL-'UQUBAT 44-49 (Alexandria, Egypt: Dar Nashr al-Thaqafah
1964); see also MUHAMMAD ABU ZAHRA, AL-JARIMA WA AL-'UQUBA FI AL-FIQH AL
ISLAMI (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al- 'Arabi n.d.) [hereinafter, ABU ZAHRA, AL-JARIMA].
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ages to evaluate the expressive abilities of all Moroccans. What is far
more pertinent is the fact that what Rosen claims about Moroccans
and their inability to express themselves without waiving their hands,
unfortunately, is quite similar to the type of anti-Semitic caricatures of
the mannerisms of Jews that one frequently encounters in European
pre-modem literature.7
Methodologically, the least one can say is that in constructing the
image of the "other," Rosen is well advised to show restraint, and sen
sitivity so as to avoid unfortunate stereotypes. But Rosen's arguments
are replete with other inexplicable methodological oversights, and
puzzling exaggerations and inaccuracies. After Rosen makes the un
fortunate comment about the hand-waving Moroccans, he goes on to
explain that in the practice of Arab and Islamic law, the styles of
speech by which testimony is shaped, and legal remedies are articu
lated remain similar to the language people use in everyday life. In
other words, according to Rosen, the language used in the practice of
law in the Arab world is similar to the language used by lay people in
their everyday activities. Rosen states that Arab and Islamic law pos
sess "little of the strange formality or professionalized distortions
found in some other systems of law." Rosen adds: "The result, then, is
a legal system that remains relatively close to the terms and percep
tions found in a host of other domains of social life" (p. 74). This,
however, is a most curious claim. Any person who has read books on
Islamic law in their original language is struck by the highly technical
jargon that is quite distinct from the everyday language used in socie
ties of the past or present. Furthermore, contrary to Rosen's claims,
courts in urban centers in the Arab world are quite formal, and
whether one examines briefs drafted by lawyers or judgments issued
by courts, one is struck by the fact that the language used is very tech
nical and generally incomprehensible to the laity. The fact that lawyers
use a less technical language to examine or cross-examine witnesses on
the stand does not mean that Arab courts lack formality. Good law
yers, whether from the Arab world or the United States, tend to direct
questions to witnesses in an accessible language so that they can draw
out the facts. But Arab lawyers and judges, like most lawyers and
judges in the world, write in a language that is very different from the
language used to question a witness, and the law itself, which they im
plement, is drafted in a language that is highly technical and profes7. This anti-Semitic stereotype is portrayed in the movie Uprising (Warner Bros., 2001),
a film about the Warsaw Ghetto revolt against the Nazis. Jurgen Stroop, a German propa
ganda officer, interviews the chief Rabbi of Warsaw in the context of making a movie about
Jews. The Rabbi starts speaking on film in a dignified and restrained manner, but the officer
tells the Rabbi that something is missing - the Rabbi is not acting sufficiently Jewish. In
order to look authentically Jewish, the officer tells the Rabbi that he should wave his hands
as he speaks. The Rabbi has no choice but to comply, and he starts speaking while mechani
cally, and somewhat comically, waving his hands.
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sionalized. Rosen, however, is keen on portraying Islamic and Arab
law as somehow different from modern legal systems,8 and although
he does not say as much, it is fair to conclude that he tends to perceive
Islamic and Arab law as quite primitive.9 For example, Rosen con
cludes that Islamic and Arab law do not have appellate levels of re
view, and even more, they do not need such appellate levels because
of the indeterminacy of law and reality among Arabs. Appellate courts
are not needed because they would yield definitive results that would
tend to ignore a range of localized realities and practices. This is not
acceptable, Rosen posits, because Arabs and Muslims wish to live in
ambivalence. According to Rosen, appellate courts would not sit well
with Arab and Islamic legal cultures (pp. 35, 182). This argument,
however, is entirely inaccurate. Apparently, Rosen is not aware of the
complex Islamic pre-modern jurisprudence that regulated the jurisdic
tion of courts, including which issues are susceptible to being over
turned by a higher court and which are not.10 Apparently, Rosen is
also not aware that most Arab countries have developed fairly sophis
ticated rules of procedure that regulate which types of cases can be
appealed and where, and most Arab countries have appellate courts
including a supreme court.11 Perhaps, Rosen believes that the appel8. Throughout his book, Rosen uses the expression "Arab law" without explaining what
he exactly nieans by this. It is fair to say that French and Islamic laws, to varying degrees,
have influenced most legal systems in Arabic-speaking countries. Furthermore, certain legal
scholars, such as Sanhuri, Shehata, and al-'Awa, have influenced a large number of legal sys
tems in the Arab world. However, the expression "Arab law" does not adequately express
the tremendous varieties of legal culture and practice in the Arab world. For pedagogical
reasons, I am using the expression "Arab law" in this Essay, but I note that it is more accu
rate to speak in terms of Arab laws and Arab legal systems - in the plural rather than the
singular. While I do believe that there are common doctrines and institutions that unify the
legal systems of most Arabic speaking countries, one must also be cognizant of the fact that
there are many differences as well.
9. Rosen would say that Arab and Islamic legal practices are different, not primitive.
This, however, I believe, is disingenuous. The caricature of Arab and Islamic legal systems
that Rosen constructs is remarkably similar to the characteristics of primitive legal systems
as analyzed by Diamond in his masterful study. See A. S. DIAMOND, PRIMITIVE LAW (1935).
10. SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARAFI 14, 194 (1996); J.S. Nielsen, Mazalim, in 6
THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 933 (H.A.R. Gibb et al., eds., 2d ed. 1960-2001) (hereinaf
ter ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM]; E. Tyan, Kadi, in 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra, at
373. On the historical practice of Chief Judges and their jurisdiction and powers, which in
cluded the power of appellate review, in the.pre-modern Islamic legal tradition, see 'ABO
AL-RAZZAQ 'ALI AL-ANBARI, MANSIB QADI AL-QUDAT Fl AL-DAWLA AL-'ABASIYYA
(Beirut: al-'Arabiyya li'l Mawsu'at 1987); 'ISAM MUHAMMAD SHABARU, QADI AL-QUDAT
FI AL-ISLAM (Beirut: Dar al-Nahda al-'Arabiyya 1992).
11. For examples of Arab laws concerning courts of appeal (mahakim al-isti'naf) and
their jurisdiction, see AHMAD ABU AL-WAFA, QANUN AL-MURAFA'AT AL-MADANIYYA
WA AL-TUARIYYA 397-98 .(Alexandria, Egypt: Dar al-Ma'arif, 7th ed. 1964) ANWAR AL
'AMRUSI, QAWA'ID WA IJRA'AT IJAR AL-AMAKIN WA TAKHFID AL-UJRA 326-28 (Alexan
dria, Egypt: Dar Nashr al-Thaqafa 1966).
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late courts that exist in the vast majority of Arab countries today are
the product of Western influence, and therefore, are not authentically
Islamic. However, Rosen does not explain what criteria would objec
tively define lslamicity or authenticity in an Islamic context. Most cer
tainly, Rosen does not pretend to be a Muslim cleric who has the
authority to differentiate between what is truly Islamic and what can
be deemed a corruption of the tradition.
Another matter that raises similar issues as the one dealt with
above is Rosen's insistence that Islamic and Arab legal practice relies
on direct testimony and oral evidence. Rosen spends a considerable
amount of time exaggerating the role oral evidence plays in Islamic
and Arab legal systems and, like many Orientalists, he obsesses about
the role of written documents in Islamic law, insisting that written
documents have an elusive role to play in court adjudications (p. 5). In
Rosen's estimation, Arabs consider oral evidence to be more reliable
than written evidence, and he implies that circumstantial evidence has
a problematic position in Islamic/Arab culture. In evaluating the role
of written documents, Rosen heavily relies on an assessment of the
function played by public notaries in Morocco. He intimates that reli
ance on public notaries is an indication that Arabs distrust written
documents. Rosen, however, notes that "a great many of the litigants"
treated written documents as "near-sacred objects to be protected at
all costs" (p. 101). Putting all the pieces together, I am not sure what
conclusions Rosen wants to reach. Our own legal system in the United
States frequently relies on public notaries, but does this necessarily
mean that Americans do not trust written documents? Furthermore,
why isn't the fact that some Arabs guard their written documents with
their lives an indication of the importance and reliability of written
documents in Arab culture? In many ways, the reliance on oral evi
dence is a common characteristic of a pre-modem legal system, and
Rosen does seem keen on giving the impression that Arabs and
Muslims live in some bazaar-like pre-modem limbo. But it is strange
that Rosen persistently ignores any evidence that disturbs his world
view of Arabs, Muslims, and Islamic law. For example, Rosen states:
"it can be argued that a move has begun in Islamic law toward more
use of circumstantial evidence, concepts of probability, and the notion
that things - and not only sentient beings - can cause things to hap
pen" (p. 43). This statement is startling in its grudging acceptance of
the possibility that Arabs ·and Muslims might actually be employing
legal methods that have been known to the common law and civil law
systems for at least two hundred years. Furthermore, Rosen's claim is
entirely inaccurate because circumstantial evidence and notions of
probability have been employed in Islamic law and in Arab legal sys
tems for centuries. In Islamic law and the laws of most Arab countries,
a qarina (pl. qara'in) (legal evidence) could be oral or written, and it
could be direct or indirect, and a qarina rarely leads to certainty
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(yaqin), but it does lead to a probability of belief (ghalabat al-zann).
In Islamic law, the standard of proof varies depending on the legal is
sue. Murder or adultery, for instance, can be proven only if all doubt is
negated (bi in'idam al-shubha), while contractual matters require only
a preponderance of belief (bi ghalabat al-zann). Similarly, circumstan
tial evidence is admissible in every Arab jurisdiction, including Saudi
Arabia, and there are varying standards of proof depending on the le
gal issue at hand.12
The legal world that Rosen describes is odd and unfamiliar for any
specialist on Islamic law,13 or for any person who has practiced law in
urban centers in the Arab world. If Rosen accurately understands the
legal practices that he documents in his book, all one can say is that his
empirical sample, whether it is the town of Sefrou or some other place,
is a strange one indeed. But aside from the empirical sample problem,
Rosen's knowledge of Islamic law is highly suspect. As part of his ar
gument that, for Arabs and Muslims, truth is highly subjective and
constantly shifting, he states: "In Islam, from its earliest times, it is
clear that proof depends far more on who it is that says a thing is so
than on what may be determined independent of who asserts it."14
12. On the use of circumstantial evidence in Islamic and Arab law, see ABU ZAHRA,
AL-JARIMA, supra note 6, at 198-240; 'AWAD MUHAMMAD 'AWAD, DIRASAT Fl AL-F!QH
AL-JINA'! AL-ISLAM! 53-94 (Kuwait: Dar al-Buhuth al-'Ilmiyya 1983); AHMAD FATH!
BAHNASI, AL-SIYASA AL-JINA'IYYA FI AL-SHARI'A AL-ISLAMIYYA 367-69, 430-38 (Cairo:
Dar al-Shuruq 1983) [hereinafter BAHNASI, AL-SIYASA AL-JINA'IYYA]; AHMAD FATH!
BAHNASI, NAZARIYYAT AL-ITHBAT FI AL-FIQH AL-JINA'! AL-ISLAM! 191-204 (Cairo: Dar
al-Shuruq 1989).
13. One of the most startling remarks that Rosen makes about Islamic law occurs at the
very beginning of his book. Rosen claims that Islamic law is a field where "abstract theologi
cal speculations" take place, and that Islamic legal texts address, among other things, ques
tions of theology. P. ix. This claim betrays a basic Jack of familiarity with the classical and
modem Islamic legal literature. In reality, theology, leave alone the speculative type, is con
spicuously absent from Islamic legal treatises. Theological questions are dealt with in a dif
ferent genre of works dedicated to 'aqa'id (Islamic beliefs). Unfortunately, one suspects that
Rosen has not read primary Islamic legal sources, and that his impressions about Islamic law
are based on secondary sources, and on his social encounters in a few courts in a few Arabic
speaking countries.
14. P. 180. Rosen also claims that there is a system of "person classification" in Islamic
law. By knowing a person's origins, Muslims believe that they can know a person's charac
teristic relationships and actions. P. 51. As a matter of socio-cultural practice, this might be
true in certain parts of the Arab world. But it is unsupported in Islamic law. Many pre
modem Muslim jurists did accept certain classifications; such as, free, slave, indentured,
Muslim, protected non-Muslim, unprotected non-Muslim, man, and woman. These classifica
tions made a difference in identifying appropriate legal remedies, so for example, some ju
rists argued that personal injury compensation is higher for men than women. But the vast
majority of Muslim jurists never claimed that the genealogy, social background, or class has
any relevance to ascertaining a person's characteristic relationships or actions. If Rosen's
judges are making social and economic origin determinative in their assessment of credibility
or in ascertaining the facts of the case, they are acting in clear violation of the rules of evi
dence in Islamic law.
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Rosen does not cite any sources for this rather peculiar claim. At a
minimum, his claim flies in the face of the persistent Qur'anic empha
sis on truthful testimony, and on speaking the truth even if it be
against one's family, clan, or beloved ones.15 Much of Rosen's argu
ments seem to rely on the fact that classical Islamic jurists insisted that
only the testimony of what they described as 'udul may be admitted in
a court of law. 'Udul (sing. 'adl) means just persons or credible wit
nesses. According to this doctrine, the testimony of a person who has
been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude or of a crime involving
fraud may not be admitted.in a court of law unless such a person has
been rehabilitated. The testimony of a just person may be admitted in
court, but it is left to the judge to determine the weight to be given to
the testimony of such a person. On the other hand, the testimony of
unjust individuals is considered inherently unreliable and therefore, it
is excluded.16 This, however, hardly supports Rosen's sweeping claims
about the nature of truth in Islamic law.17 Nonetheless, Rosen's char
acterizations on this matter are a part of his larger claims about Arabs
and their relationship to causation, truth, and intentionality. For
Rosen, in the Arab context, all three elements are defined by status
and acts. It is the status and actions of a person that define their inten15. QUR'AN 4:135; 5:8; see al$O id. at 2:282, 2:140, 2:283, 5:108.
16. AL-KHASSAF, KITAB ADAB AL-QADI, supra note 6, at 292-314; AL-SADR AL
SHAHID, KITAB SHARH ADAB AL-QADI, supra note 6, at 3:3-4:3; IBN AB! AL-DAMM, KITAB
ADAB AL-QADA', supra note 6, at 302-03; BURHAN AL-DIN ABU AL-HASAN AL
MARGHINANI, 2 AL-HIDAYA SHARH BIDAYAT AL-MUBTADI 404 (Muhammad 'Adnan
Darwish ed., Beirut: Dar al-Arqam n.d.) [hereinafter AL-MARGHINANI, AL-HIDAYA];
MUHAMMAD B. JARIR AL-TABAR!, AL-AHKAM AL-FIQHIYYA 385-89 (Muhammad Hasan
Muhammad Hasan Isma'il ed., Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 2000) [hereinafter, JARIR
AL-TABAR!, AL-AHKAM AL-FIQHIYYA); ABU 'ABO ALLAH MUHAMMAD B. NASR AL
MARWAZI, IKHTILAF AL-FuQAHA'· 555 (Muhammad Tahir Hakim, ed., Riyadh, Adwa' al
Salaf 2000); 'ABO AL-QADIR 'AWDAH, 2 AL-TASHRI' AL-JINA'! AL-ISLAMI MUQARANAN BI
AL-QANUN AL-WAD'! 401-05 (Beirut, Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi n,d.) [hereinafter 'ABO AL
QADIR 'AWDAH, AL-TASHRI' AL-JINA'!); BAHNASI, AL-SIYASA AL-JINA'IYYA, supra note
12, at 388-408.
17. Notably, there are similar concerns about the credibility of witnesses with criminal
convictions in the common law system. Traditionally, the common law system disqualified
witnesses who had been convicted of treason, felony, or a crime involving fraud or deceit. In
1917, the United States Supreme Court abolished the disqualification rule in federal criminal
trials. Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1917). The Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 601,
confirmed that witness disqualification was no longer recognized in federal jurisdictions.
However, the witness disqualification rule remained in effect in some .state jurisdictions in
the United States. Currently, rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that, un
der certain circumstances, prior criminal convictions may be used to impeach the credibility
of a witness. In summary, Islamic law credibility and witness disqualification rules are very
similar to the .old common law approach. The chosen approach of contemporary American
federal law is to impeach - not disqualify. But whatever one thinks of the relative merits of
the Islamic or old common law approaches compared to the contemporary approach in U.S.
federal courts, the basic underlying issue is credibility, and how to assess it. Put simply, con
trary to what Rosen incessantly implies, there is nothing particularly exotic or marvelous
about the Islamic legal approach, nor does the Islamic approach reveal a truth about Muslim
or Arab conceptions of truth, time, social relations, or reality.
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tions, and their relationship to causation and truth. Rosen is thus able
to proclaim: "Indeed, most Arabs do not recognize the idea of a dis
tinct inner self that could exist apart from action, only a realm of overt
expressions that must of necessity conform to what a person must
carry inside himself" (p. 72). He then goes on to say: "For the Arabs it
also follows that what matters most, in evaluating actions is not their
connection to a series of abstract propositions that lie behind them but
to the consequences that actions have in the world, their impact on
those networks of relationships, those webs of obligation, that are con
stitutive of reality itself" (p. 72). Continuing the same line of reason
ing, Rosen asserts: "For it is believed that a man's acts are necessarily
connected to his state of mind and that such a set of acts can be deci
phered in terms of social background, connections, and modes of ne
gotiating obligations, then it follows that for the Arabs another's in
tentions are regarded as readily available to discernment and do not
constitute a separate domain hidden from human view."18 From this
analysis, Rosen is able to contrast Western and Arab notions of liabil
ity, and in that vein, he concludes: "By contrast, for Arabs the extent
of actual liability has very little if anything to do with the willfulness of
one's acts; fault is largely displaced by repercussion, itself an amalgam
of one's own situation and that of the. injured party" (p. 79). From
these sweeping generalizations about Arabs, Rosen goes on, un
daunted, to generalize about many aspects of Islamic law. According
to Rosen, "it is generally said of Islamic law that it is a system that
pays no attention to an actor's state of mind when a hadd-type wrong
is involved" (p. 76). Hadd offenses are considered major crimes in
Islamic law; such crimes include adultery, theft, apostasy, and slander.
But Rosen goes beyond generalizing about hadd-type crimes. He
claims that strict liability applies to major religious infractions, that in
cases of murder, the intent of the offender is imputed predominantly
from the weapon employed, and that animals, children, and even in
fants are strictly liable for injuries that they cause (pp. 76-79).
For all this, Rosen does not inform the reader who exactly it is that
says that Islamic law is a system that pays no attention to an actor's
18. P. 77. Throughout his book, Rosen mentions that Arab judges claim that they can
tell whether a witness is being truthful by looking into their eyes and at their facial expres
sions. See, e.g., pp. 13-14, 23, 77, 118. Rosen does not explain whether he considers this to be
a unique aspect of Arab legal practices. He does seem to think, however, that this judicial
approach to the assessment of credibility somehow supports his claims about contingency
and negotiability in Islamic and Arab legal culture, and the ultimate otherness and exotic
ness of Arabs and Muslims. Interestingly, however, Rosen ignores the fact that common law
and civil law judges make the exact same claim about their ability to assess the credibility of
witnesses. In my experience, Anglo-American and French judges often claim that they can
assess credibility by looking directly into a witness's eyes, and assessing their gestures and
facial expressions.
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state of mind. He doe� not cite any original sources, but relies exclu
sively on a few Orientalist sources written in the first half of the past
century. In reality, Rosen is simply wrong. Muslim jurists do not im
pose strict liability in the case of hadd crimes, and the state of mind of
the offender is crucial for establishing liability. The majority of jurists
hold that a mistaken belief as to facts, for instance, in believing that
you are married to someone in a case of adultery, or believing that you
have a right to the property in the .case of theft, acts as a shubha (an
element of doubt) that mitigates punishment, or negates liability alto
gether.19 Furthermore, in torts, as opposed to crimes, the idea of strict
liability is premised on the argument that as between the competing
interests, the victim of an injury ought to be compensated. In other
words, this is a position of social welfare, not a negation of state of
mind analysis. In all cases, Muslim jurists were extremely reluctant to
hold a person liable for injuries that resulted from unforeseeable con
sequences. Compensation was often hinged on foreseeability, which in
turn, involved a careful evaluation of the subjective state of mind of
the offending party.20 As to Rosen's odd claim that an infant is to be
held personally liable for injuries, this is simply without foundation.
No classical jurist held that an infant is personally liable for injury.
Furthermore, children are not liable for their intentional criminal acts
because children are considered incapable of forming the requisite
mental state for the commission of a crime.21 Even Rosen's claim
about whether in a case of murder the weapon used may establish the
offender's state of mind is unwarranted. What Rosen ignores is that
what Muslim jurists referred to as the "instrument of death (adat al
qatl)" position, was fundamentally an argument about foreseeability.
The issue was, if a person strikes another with a sword or any other
19. AL-KHASSAF, KITAB ADAB AL-QADI, supra note 6, at 731-37; AL-SADR AL
SHAHID, 4 KITAB SHARH ADAB AL-QADI, supra note 6, at 475-80.
20. For example, the medieval Hanafi jurist al-Marghinani writes of one who digs a

hole, sewer, or gutter in a public street, or a street that he knows or should know is utilized
by people: if a passerby falls in the hole or sewer, and is hurt, the digger must pay compensa
tion to the injured party if the injury was to be expected. On the other hand, if the hole or
sewer was dug in a deserted or private pathway, the digger is not liable if the injury was not
expected. In other words, in effect, this means that the actions of the digger are the proxi
mate cause of the injury if it was foreseeable. AL-MARGHINANI, 4 AL-HIDAYA, supra note
16, at 477. In addition, classical jurists debated at length whether a doctor or other profes
sional is liable for negligence or only recklessness. Some jurists argued that professionals
who have obtained the necessary degrees and licenses ought to be held liable under the
higher standard of recklessness, not negligence. IBN RUSHD, BIDAYAT AL-MUJTAHID, Dar
Ibn Hazm ed., supra note 5, at 734-35; ABU ZAHRA, AL-JARIMA, supra note 6, at 423-29.

21. In fact, classical jurists say the exact opposite of what Rosen claims. The requisite
mental state is a necessary element in order to hold an offender liable for a crime, including
hudud crimes. Therefore, the insane cannot be held criminally liable. Legal discourses on
children and tortand criminal law is known as ahkam al-Sighar. See ABU ZAHRA, AL
JARIMA, supra note 16, at 407-83; 'ABD AL-QADIR 'AWDAH, 1 AL-TASHRI' AL-JINA'!, supra
note 16, at 600-06.

May2002]

1437

Islamic Law

similar deadly weapon, can such a person claim that the death of the
victim was not foreseeable? The Hanafi school of law, in particular,
held that the use of some instruments or weapons establish a rebutta
ble presumption that the injury or death was intentional. The other
schools of thought maintained that the use of particular instruments is
a factor to be considered, but since the ultimate issue that must be de
termined is the offender's state of mind, no presumption ought to fol
low because of the use of a particular instrument by the accused.22
Rosen interprets much of Islamic law in a fashion that does not
comport with any textual source. For example, one of the main
sources of Islamic law is rule by analogy (qiyas). According to Rosen,
qiyas is framed in terms of repercussions instead of antecedent pre
cepts. In using qiyas, a judge "will compare outcomes rather than prior
rules, results rather than causes" (p. 32). Rather inconsistently, Rosen
remarks that judges in the Arab world note that no two cases are ex
actly the same, and therefore, strict adherence to precedent is inap
propriate. Rosen does not ascribe this practice to the influence of the
French legal system upon many Arab countries, but implies that this
practice is indicative of something traditionally Islamic.23 Rosen con
tends that the reason Arab judges do not treat any two cases the same
is because judges, in deciding cases, try to validate the present status
of people, and maintain people on a course in which they can continue
the process of social negotiation without any significant disruption
(p. 23). This is why, according to Rosen, rights or justice, as an abstract
theory or concept, do not matter in Arab and Islamic law. Rosen,
however, misunderstands the role of qiyas in Islamic law, and to the
extent that he claims that this juristic method influences Muslim
judges, his analysis is inaccurate. Contrary to what Rosen claims, qiyas
does not turn on repercussions, outcomes, or results. In fact, a rule
based on qiyas or analogy turns solely on what is described as the op
erative cause of the law ( 'ilia). According to the method of qiyas, if
two cases involve the same material causes or principles, the ruling in
a prior case can be extended to a new case. The classic example of this
is that if date wine is prohibited because it is an intoxicant, then grape
22. See JARIR AL-TABARI, AL-AHKAM AL-FIQHIYYA, supra note 16, at 340-42; ABU AL
WALID MUHAMMAD B. AHMAD B. MUHAMMAD B. AHMAD lBN RUSHD, 2 BIDAYAT AL
MUJTAHID WA NIHAYAT AL-MUQTASID 580-81 ('Adil Ahmad 'Abd al-Mawjud et al., eds.,
Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 1997); AL-MARGHINANI, 4. AL-HIDAYA, supra note 16, at
448-49; ABU ZAHRA, AL-JARIMA, supra note 6, at 347-53; 'ABO AL-QADIR AWDAH 2 AL
TASHRI' AL-JINA'I, supra note 16, at 25-36; AHMAD FATHI BAHNASI, AL-QISAS FI AL-FIQH
AL-ISLAMI 73-84 (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq 1982).
'

,

23. The French Civil law system has had a profound influence on many countries in the
Arab world, and in this legal system, there is a limited use of stare decisis. In this legal sys
tem, the facts of each case are considered unique and specific, and so no two cases can be the
same.
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wine can also be prohibited for the same cause.24 Rosen seems to have
a very poor handle over the whole logic and practice of qiyas. At one
point, Rosen characterizes sound analogy as ta'wil (p. 52 n. 38). This
again is one of those inexplicable claims for which Rosen cites no
source. Ta'wil means interpretations or exegesis - it is the employ
ment of hermeneutic methodologies in an attempt to understand the
text. Sound analogy would be described as qiyas sahih, not ta'wil.
The source of Rosen's understanding of qiyas is a mystery, but
Rosen does not seem to find any particular need to cite sources for
many of his claims about the Islamic tradition. At one point, he claims,
without citation, that the Prophet Muhammad stated that there is no
distinction among believers except as to knowledge, and he uses this
to support his argument that Arabs are preoccupied with knowing the
status and relationships of individuals (pp. 70, 143). In twenty years of
researching the Islamic tradition, I have never encountered this pur
ported statement that he attributes to the Prophet, and my efforts to
locate this report yielded nothing. The closest that is found in the Is
lamic tradition, is a statement in which the Prophet asserts that the
only distinction among the believers is piety (taqwa).25 Furthermore,
Rosen is often hesitant and unsure when it comes to Islamic legal his
tory. In one notable example, Rosen repeats the Orientalist fiction re
garding the closing of the doors of ijtihad in Islamic legal history.26
Rosen cites Waet Hallaq on this issue, which is rather strange because
of all Western scholars, no one has done as much to dispel this fiction
as Hallaq.27 Nevertheless, in one part of his book, consistent with
Hallaq's analysis, Rosen argues that the doors of ijtihad were never
closed at all. Yet, in other parts of the book he contends that the doors
of ijtihad were left ajar by the incorporation of custom and social prac
tice into Islamic law (pp. 32, 52, 97). In reality, the doors of ijtihad
were never closed either formally or informally, but the incorporation
of social practices and custom into Islamic law has remained a prob
lematic issue. Most of Rosen's research was conducted in Morocco,
which follows the Maliki school of law. Of the various Islamic schools,
24. WAEL HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO
SUNNI USUL AL-FIQH 83-95 (1997); MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMAL!, PRINCIPLES OF
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 197-228 (rev. ed. 1991) [hereinafter KAMAL!, PRINCIPLES OF
ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE]; BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 67 (1998).
25. Rosen also tends to refer to unidentified Arab poets or acquaintances in support of
his arguments without citation or documentation. Pp. 43, 85.
26. According to this fiction, around the tenth century, Muslim jurists decided that all
the significant problems in law have been answered and therefore, there was no need for
novel or new interpretations or opinions. Consequently, Muslim jurists declared that the
doors for independent and novel reasoning (ijtihad) have now and forever been closed.
JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 69-75 (reprint ed., Clarendon Press
1993) (1964).
27. Wael Hallaq, Was the Gate ofljtihad Closed?, 16 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 3 (1984).
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the Malikis were the most accepting of custom as a source of law.
Other schools relegated custom to an inferior role or excluded it alto
gether. Rosen, however, does not acknowledge, or is perhaps un
aware, that what he identifies as a general Islamic and Arab charac
teristic (i.e. the incorporation and reliance on custom) is a distinctly
Maliki doctrine.28 Perhaps Rosen would respond to this criticism by
claiming that what the formal expositions regarding custom found in
the formal sources of Islamic law are immaterial, whereas what he ob
serves to be the anthropological practice of law is material. Neverthe
less, Rosen cannot ignore that most of his empirical data has been
collected from Maliki jurisdictions that'have been far more tolerant of
different customary practices.
Rosen, himself, claims that language and textual sources are im
portant for understanding Islamic and Arab culture. He asserts the
following: "To see how some of these elements evince themselves in
the Arabo-Islamic worldview it is, as is so often the case when dealing
with this part of the world, essential to grasp some of the terms in
volved in Arabic itself" (p. 134). Rosen analyzes the meaning of sev
eral legal terms in Islamic law in order to demonstrate the "Arabo
Islamic worldview." Because of space constraints, it is not possible for
me to review all of Rosen's linguistic analysis, but the least one can say
about his arguments concerning. Arabic terminology is that it is
strained. I will focus on two demonstrative examples. Rosen analyzes
the meaning of the word aman. Aman could mean a state of safety or
security, or trust, and is often used in Islamic law to mean the granting
of assurances of safe conduct to a merchant, traveler, or diplomat.29
Rosen, however, takes this meaning to a qifferent direction. For him,
aman tends to convey "a sense of personal attachment between those
who trust one another rather than confidence in institutions, office
holders, or even one's own knowledge or abilities'' (p. 135). Rosen
also analyzes the meaning of the word wathiqa, which means to trust
and rely on someone. Wathiqa is derived from the root word thiqa,

28. YASIN DUTTON, THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC LAW: THE QUR'AN, THE MUWAITA '
AND MAD/NAN AMA L (1999); KAMAL!, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra
note 24, at 283-96; SUBHI MAHMASSANI, FALSAFAT AL-TASHRI' FI AL-ISLAM 236-45 (Bei
rut: Dar al-'Ilm Ii al-Malayin, 3d ed. 1961). On the use of custom in Islamic criminal law, see
ABU ZAHRA, AL-JARIMA, supra note 6, at 214-16.
'

29. IBN MANZUR, 13 LISAN AL-'ARAB 27 (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 6th ed. 1997) [hereinafter
IBN MANZUR, LISAN AL-'ARAB) . For an introductory treatment of aman, see J. Schacht,
Aman, in 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 10, at 429. On the legal doctrine of
aman, see generally, AL-MARGHINANI, 4 AL-HIDAYA, supra note 16, at 444-48; SHAMS AL
DIN MUHAMMAD B. MUHAMMAD AL-SHIRBINI, 6 MUGHNI AL-MUHTAJ ILA MA'RIFAT
MA'ANI ALFAZ AL-MINHAJ 51-68 ('Ali Muhammad Mu'awwad & 'Adil Ahmad 'Abd al
Mawjud eds., Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 2000).
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which means trust.30 Rosen, however, argues that, since one variant of
this word could mean to bind or fetter, terms of trust in the Arab
world reveal an important part of the "Arabo-Islamic worldview."
Trust or reliance is a creative act of mutual limitation in which people
limit and fetter each other in this constant process of social negotiation
(p. 135). The meanings of both these words, however, do not support
Rosen's claims. There is no support for Rosen's contention that aman
implies trust in one another that does not include institutions or gov
ernments. In fact, in Islamic legal usage, aman does connote a state of
safety or security that is offered and guaranteed by the government or
state. In addition, wathiqa is quite different from awthaqa. Wathiqa
means to trust - for instance, to trust in God (al-thiqa fi'llah). It does
not imply that there is a state of mutual limitation between God and
human beings. A wthaqa means to tie up or bind, and it does not entail
any degree of trust or mutual reliance.
Rosen does not engage in these linguistic speculations for their
own sake. He has a much larger point, one that is quite problematic.
Rosen argues that Arabs and Muslims have a distinctive sense of time
and space. Engaging in various linguistic exercises, Rosen claims that
Arabs and Muslims have no concept of public property or space in "ei
ther a spatial or metaphoric sense" (pp. 137, 198). All property and
space is either privately owned or belongs . to God. Even more, Arabs
and Muslims do not have a sense of chronological time. Elaborating
upon this point, Rosen states:
But Westerners who approach the Quran or listen to Arabs relating
popular stories or accounts often find the recitation confusing and dis
jointed. Instead of moving in a fairly clear chronological order the story
often jumps about in time: Instead of a clear picture of events being
given by referring to the sequence of their occurrence, central characters
are referred to in numerous situations whose precise chronological order
is not necessarily given. (p. 71)

This, of course, is consistent with Rosen's argument that all truth,
facts, and rights for Arabs are situational and relative. Nevertheless,
Rosen is able to make these claims only by ignoring a substantial
amount of contrary evidence. In fact, the idea of public property (am
wal 'amma) and public utilities or roads (turuq 'amma and manafi'
'amma) is found in all classical Islamic law books, in modern Arab
legislation, and in all Arab social practices. Rosen's inaccurate claim is
offensive precisely because it ignores the cumulative textual evidence
of centuries, and even the contemporary Arab experience with social
ism and the nationalization of private properties into publicly owned
properties. Both Islamic law and modern Arab law have numerous

30. IBN MANZUR, 10 LISAN AL-'ARAB, supra note 29, at 371.
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discourses on the ownership and regulation of public properties.31 In
addition, Rosen has not read a single pre-modern or modern book of
history written in the Arabic speaking world. Pre-modern history
books especially were often organized chronologically and not the
matically. And, even a book of literature such as A Thousand and One
Nights proceeds in chronological order as Shehrazade burns the mid
night oil one night, and one parable at a time.
The main problem with Rosen's analysis is that it is the quintessen
tial example of result-oriented scholarship. Rosen cites anything that
he believes supports his caricatured image of Arabs and Muslims,
without bothering with any contrary evidence or even the specifics of
the examples he uses. On various occasions, Rosen likens Arab and
Muslim culture, and even Islamic jurisprudence to a chess game in
which all moves have implications for the overall picture, and in which
the possibilities of movement and strategy are endless. He even goes
so far as to claim that chess, as opposed to games of chance, became
"the consummate Muslim game" (pp. 82, 186). But Rosen does not
address the fact that even this part of his worldview of Arabs and
Muslims is problematic because many Muslim jurists have prohibited
the playing of chess.32 In addition, the most popular game in the
Middle East and the one played most often in coffee houses is back
gammon, not chess. Another telling example of Rosen's methodology
is a part of his book in which he takes the liberty of contrasting West
ern and Arab notions of justice. Rosen's point is that while Westerners
speak of rights and entitlements, Arabs speak of contexts and relation31. For example, various levies and taxes such as the khums, Kharaj, and 'ushur were
considered public monies to be spent by the central authority for the welfare of the Muslims
(masalih al-Muslimin), such as sustaining a military and building fortresses, dams, and public
roads. ABU AL-HASAN AL-MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM AL-SULTANIYYA 162 (Beirut: Dar al
Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 1985); ABU YA'LA AL-FARRA', AL-AHKAM AL-SULTANIYYA 137
(Muhammad Hamid al-Fiqi ed., Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 1983). For a general his
tory of the Islamic public treasury (bayt al-ma!), see N.J. Coulson et al., Bayt al-Mal, in 1
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 10, at 1141. On public treasuries and public utilities
in Islamic law, see 'ABO AL-HAMID MUHAMMAD AL-QADI, IQTASADIYYAT AL-MALIYYA
AL-'AMMA WA AL-NIZAM AL-MALI FI AL-ISLAM (Alexandria: Dar al-Jami'at al-Misriyya
"
1980). On the process of eminent domain procedures for the public welfare (naz' milkiyyat
al-'aqarat Ii al-manfa'a al-'amma) in modern Arab law, see AL-QAWANIN AL-MUKAMMILA
LI AL-QANUN AL-MADAN! 87-109 (n.p.: Dar al-Fikr al-Hadith 1964). On the doctrines of
public property, works and utilities, and eminent domain in Islamic and Arab laws, see SA'D
MUHAMMAD KHALIL, NAZ' AL-MILKIYYA LI'L MANFA'A AL-'AMMA BAYN AL-SHARI'A
WA AL-QANUN (Cairo: Dar al-Salam 1993).
32. YUSUF AL-QARADAWI, THE LAWFUL AND THE PROHIBITED IN ISLAM 299-300
(AL-HALAL WAL HARAM FIL ISLAM) (Kamal El-Helbawy trans., 1994); ABU BAKR JABIR
AL-JAZA'IRI, MINHAJ AL-MUSLIM 463-64 (Medina: Maktabat al-'Ulum wa al-Hikam 1996);
ABU 'ABO AL-ALLAH AL-HAKIM AL-TIRMIDHI, AL-MANHIYYAT 69 (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub
al-'Ilmiyya 1986). Incidentally, the game of chess is said to have been invented by an Indian
Brahmin for his king's pleasure. HERMAN KULKE & DIETMAR ROTHERMUND, A HISTORY
OF INDIA 8 (3d. ed. 1998).
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ships. Rosen then asserts that nothing captures the Islamic notion of
justice with greater clarity and poignancy than a tale told by the Ber
bers of the high Atlas mountains of Morocco about how Justice and
Injustice came to be separated for all time (p. 173). Interestingly, how
ever, the Berbers, although Muslim, are not Arab. But this hardly
seems to matter because in Rosen's mind Moroccans, Muslims,
Berbers, Arabs, Islamic law, and everything in between are all lumped
into one indistinct mass. An example derived from one is good enough
for the other.
Considering the sweeping and often demeaning generalizations
that Rosen makes about Arabs and Muslims, I can only speculate as to
how people would react if the same generalizations were made about
other people and their legal systems. One can only speculate about
Rosen's motivations and purposes. The end result of Rosen's analysis,
regardless of how much he tries to escape to abstractions in order to
obfuscate his conclusions, Arabs, and indeed Muslims, end up a peo
ple without notions of truth, justice, rights, public space, or even time.
It is notable that throughout his book, Rosen pleads benevolent un
derstanding. He consistently chides other scholars for being Eurocen
tric, and insists that Arabs and Muslims must be understood on their
own terms. He even defends what he believes to be the Arab and
Muslim position on the Salman Rushdie Affair and the Satanic Verses
in effect, arguing that their position makes sense within their own
cultural paradigms (pp. 189-94). He is also understanding towards
what can only be described as the authoritarian practices of some
Arab governments. He sees this authoritarianism as consistent with
Arab notions of etiquette, treason, and public shame. According to
Rosen, in Muslim and Arab culture, criticism of public officials cannot
be conducted through public channels or venues because. this would
violate Arab etiquette.33 But Rosen ignores that many Arabs and
-

33. P. 194. On this point, Rosen cites an incident in which shortly after the Gulf War, a
few hundred jurists in Saudi Arabia criticized the King's foreign policies in an open letter
published in a newspaper. The Saudi government reprimanded the jurists, reminding them
that it is inappropriate to criticize the King publicly, and that proper advice should be given
privately and personally. Rosen seems to think that the Saudi government's response repre
sented an authentic Arab norm, and that the jurists who published the open letter acted in a
way that is less authentically Arab. In reality, the Saudi government was trying simply to
protect itself and perpetuate its infamously despotic rule. For example, there were several
reports that the Saudi goverrtffient did not simply reprimand the jurists, but arrested, tor
tured, or executed most of them. Interestingly, various rulers in Islamic history have tried to
use the same exact argument used by the Saudi government. They tried to censure public
criticism by claiming that such criticism is somehow un-Islamic, and demanding that all criti
cism should be private and personal. Even more interesting, however, is the fact that the
majority of Muslim jurists did not accept this self-serving argument. In fact, there is a well
established tradition in Islam of public and visible criticism of rulers. Jurists who do so and,
as a result, suffer persecution are remembered as heroes and martyrs. For a study of this tra
dition, see KHALED ABOU EL FADL, REBELLION AND VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC LAW 68-99
(2001); MICHAEL COOK, COMMANDING RIGHT AND FORBIDDING WRONG IN ISLAMIC
THOUGHT 46-83 (2000) .
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Muslims refused to support the death sentence against Rushdie, and
even defended Rushdie's right to say whatever he pleased.34 He also
ignores Arab and Muslim aspirations for democracy, and the fact that
many would be more than happy to publicly criticize government offi
cials if they did not have to contend with the realities of persecution,
imprisonment, and torture.
Considering Rosen's clear tendency to read the evidence selec
tively, and in effect to affirm the image of the Arab and Muslim as
shifty, unprincipled, and simply different, we should ask, once again,
what motivates Rosen? Why does Rosen insist on the largely Orien
talist paradigm of the exotic bazaar to understand Arabs and
Muslims? In perhaps one very telling part of his book, Rosen advises
that in attempting to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and making
peace, Westerners must understand the Arabs' particular sense of jus
tice. Arabs can only seek to make peace "against [a] tangled, ambiva
lent, refractory, and transcendent feeling of justice," which shapes
their expectations and hopes. Rosen goes on to say: "it behooves us, in
our own quest for mutual cooperation and forbearance, to compre
hend the Arabs' felt sense of justice and render it the full measure of
our sympathy and understanding" (p. 175). In general, this might be
good advice. But, an Arab Muslim, like myself, cannot escape the con
clusion that Rosen's forbearance and benevolence is condescending.
More importantly, it is condescending towards an image of Arabs,
Muslims, and their jurisprudence that has much more to do with the
state of mind of the author than with anything in reality. Rosen's Arab
is a foggy character who is exotic and distant, and who is difficult to
understand or predict because he is constantly negotiating, shifting,
and forming. Ultimately, Rosen's Arab is difficult to trust or deal with
except with condescending forbearance, like the deceiving and con
niving merchant in the bazaar who tells you one thing and means an
other. This, I suspect is Rosen's reality. But, then again, I might be
wrong because, according to Rosen's paradigm, as an Arab, I really
have no objective sense of reality. My reality is as shifting and chang
ing as the highly situated pieces in a good game of chess.

34. See FOR RUSHDIE: ESSAYS BY ARAB AND MUSLIM WRITERS IN DEFENSE OF FREE
SPEECH (Anouar Abdullah ed., 1994).

